Rep. Cleary submits bill to help protect the public from intoxicated drivers
AUGUSTA – Rep. Richard Cleary has put forward legislation to help protect the public from intoxicated drivers.
Under current law, only results from hospital tests on blood alcohol levels are admissible evidence in court. Cleary’s legislation would also include tests for other intoxicating substances as admissible evidence.
Cleary is concerned that current law doesn’t do enough to protect Maine citizens from drivers
under the influence of substances besides alcohol.
The proposed legislation would close this loophole in Maine law and ensure that all individuals
who drive impaired, regardless of substance, are treated in the same manner by the courts.
“Right now the law only allows the prosecution to make use of blood alcohol concentration levels
and nothing else, thereby ignoring dozens of other intoxicating substances from evidence - and
providing more procedural protections to drugged drivers than drunken drivers,” said Cleary. “We need to protect our families and neighbors from those choosing to drive under the influence and give prosecutors the support they need to make convictions in these cases.”
This week Cleary’s bill was referred to the Committee on Criminal Justice and Public Safety for
further consideration. The Committee is expected to hold a public hearing on the bill in the coming weeks.
Wednesday, February 28, 2007
Saturday, February 24, 2007
Should I Stay or Should I Go?
Author: Richard C. Cleary
A recent decision of the U.S. Supreme Court may have ordinary citizens and criminal defendants alike asking the above question.
Historically, individuals, when confronted by police, had the right to ignore the officers and continue on with their business without threat of restraint, search and arrest. In January 2000 the Supreme Court decided, in Illinois v. Wardlow, that running in the opposite direction of approaching police officers gave the police sufficient “reasonable suspicion” to stop the runner and search him. The reasoning behind, and concerns arising from the decision are discussed in this article.
On September 9, 1995 Officers Nolan and Harvey were working as uniformed officers in the special operations section of the Chicago Police Department. The officers were driving the last car in a four car squad converging on a “high crime area” known for narcotics trafficking. As the officers passed 4035 West Van Buren, Nolan saw William,a/k/a “Sam”, Wardlow standing next to a building holding a bag. Wardlow spotted the officers and began running. Nolan and Harvey turned their cruiser around and pursued Wardlow as he ran through an alley. They eventually cornered him on the street and immediately conducted a pat-down search.
During the frisk, Nolan squeezed the bag Wardlow was carrying and felt a hard object similar to the shape of a gun. The officers opened the bag and discovered a loaded .38-caliber handgun. Wardlow was arrested for unlawful use of a weapon by a felon. Wardlow was subsequently convicted of the charge and he appealed. The Illinois Supreme Court sided with the defendant and ruled that sudden flight, even in a high crime area, does not give the police reasonable suspicion justifying a stop and frisk. The court explained that although police have the right to approach individuals and ask questions, the individual has no obligation to remain or respond. If the person declines to answer and simply goes on his or her way, that does not give the officer a legitimate basis for a stop. The court then reasoned that running away was simply an exercise of this right to “go on one’s way” in a speedier fashion.
The U.S. Supreme Court disagreed, stating “headlong flight,” wherever it occurs, is the consummate act of evasion. The Court dismissed the idea that unprovoked flight was merely an exercise of a person “going about one’s business,” stating such flight was the exact opposite. The Court equated this flight with “nervous, evasive behavior” which could form a legitimate basis for stopping a person and searching him. Wardlow argued that there are innocent reasons for flight from police and therefore such behavior is not indicative of ongoing criminal activity. The court agreed, but stated, the officer’s determination of reasonable suspicion must be based on “commonsense judgments and inferences about human behavior.” The Court affirmed Wardlow’s conviction.
This decision leaves open several questions.
If a person refuses to make eye contact and walks away can the officers use “commonsense judgments and inferences about human behavior” and assume the person is hiding something, thus justifying a stop?
May a person walk away from the officers quickly, or will that too justify a stop?
How fast is too fast?
What if the person remains in the location where he was confronted by the police officers, but doesn’t answer any questions?
Is that individual “going about his business” by remaining?
Can an individual skip away whistling show tunes without justifying a stop?
By basing its decision on the speed of the individuals exercise of his or her right to distance themselves from the confrontation with police, the Court has expanded police power to stop ordinary citizens without clear guidelines.
The decision will leave many wondering "should I stay or should I go?"
A recent decision of the U.S. Supreme Court may have ordinary citizens and criminal defendants alike asking the above question.
Historically, individuals, when confronted by police, had the right to ignore the officers and continue on with their business without threat of restraint, search and arrest. In January 2000 the Supreme Court decided, in Illinois v. Wardlow, that running in the opposite direction of approaching police officers gave the police sufficient “reasonable suspicion” to stop the runner and search him. The reasoning behind, and concerns arising from the decision are discussed in this article.
On September 9, 1995 Officers Nolan and Harvey were working as uniformed officers in the special operations section of the Chicago Police Department. The officers were driving the last car in a four car squad converging on a “high crime area” known for narcotics trafficking. As the officers passed 4035 West Van Buren, Nolan saw William,a/k/a “Sam”, Wardlow standing next to a building holding a bag. Wardlow spotted the officers and began running. Nolan and Harvey turned their cruiser around and pursued Wardlow as he ran through an alley. They eventually cornered him on the street and immediately conducted a pat-down search.
During the frisk, Nolan squeezed the bag Wardlow was carrying and felt a hard object similar to the shape of a gun. The officers opened the bag and discovered a loaded .38-caliber handgun. Wardlow was arrested for unlawful use of a weapon by a felon. Wardlow was subsequently convicted of the charge and he appealed. The Illinois Supreme Court sided with the defendant and ruled that sudden flight, even in a high crime area, does not give the police reasonable suspicion justifying a stop and frisk. The court explained that although police have the right to approach individuals and ask questions, the individual has no obligation to remain or respond. If the person declines to answer and simply goes on his or her way, that does not give the officer a legitimate basis for a stop. The court then reasoned that running away was simply an exercise of this right to “go on one’s way” in a speedier fashion.
The U.S. Supreme Court disagreed, stating “headlong flight,” wherever it occurs, is the consummate act of evasion. The Court dismissed the idea that unprovoked flight was merely an exercise of a person “going about one’s business,” stating such flight was the exact opposite. The Court equated this flight with “nervous, evasive behavior” which could form a legitimate basis for stopping a person and searching him. Wardlow argued that there are innocent reasons for flight from police and therefore such behavior is not indicative of ongoing criminal activity. The court agreed, but stated, the officer’s determination of reasonable suspicion must be based on “commonsense judgments and inferences about human behavior.” The Court affirmed Wardlow’s conviction.
This decision leaves open several questions.
If a person refuses to make eye contact and walks away can the officers use “commonsense judgments and inferences about human behavior” and assume the person is hiding something, thus justifying a stop?
May a person walk away from the officers quickly, or will that too justify a stop?
How fast is too fast?
What if the person remains in the location where he was confronted by the police officers, but doesn’t answer any questions?
Is that individual “going about his business” by remaining?
Can an individual skip away whistling show tunes without justifying a stop?
By basing its decision on the speed of the individuals exercise of his or her right to distance themselves from the confrontation with police, the Court has expanded police power to stop ordinary citizens without clear guidelines.
The decision will leave many wondering "should I stay or should I go?"
Monday, February 19, 2007
Maine Revenue Service Office, Houlton
Many of you no doubt have heard or read about the proposed closing of the Maine Revenue Service (“MRS”) office in Houlton, Maine. I want to emphasize the word “proposed” as the recommended closing is by no means the final word. The budget proposals must be approved by the legislature following work by the Appropriations and possibly other committees. The budget process includes an opportunity for public comment and input from concerned legislators, of which I am one.
When I learned of the proposed closing of Houlton MRS I contacted the House Chair of the Appropriations Committee, Jeremy Fischer and other members of that Committee. They have stated they will stand with me to work to save the Houlton MRS office. They do so, not because of my winning personality, but because now is not the time to close an office that is generating substantial income for the State of Maine.
As a general matter, Maine Revenue Service is, as it name implies, a revenue generating entity. The Houlton office in particular has generated substantial income from inception to present. From October 1999 through January 2007 the Houlton Office has generated revenue of $52.8 million with an annual average of $8 million. Although not tasked with the responsibility of collection, the Houlton office collected $2.7 million in the current fiscal year (from July 1, 2006 to December 31, 2006).
The Houlton Office staff is trained to process income tax, payroll tax, use tax, tax & rent (circuit breaker) and in auditing and collections. Further, the staff is ready, willing and able to engage in these tasks in “quick response” fashion. The Houlton staff is innovative and income generating. For example, this office performs 30 different audit projects in both income tax and use tax divisions. Further, there is an extremely low turnover rate for employees in the Houlton office. Since the office’s inception in 1999 only three employees have left the office. Every time there are openings at the Houlton office they are sought by many highly trained applicants.
With the State of Maine seeking new sources of revenue, now is not the time to eliminate this innovative office or to terminate these outstanding employees. I will continue to urge my fellow legislatures to objectively review the facts and reverse this unfortunate decision. I encourage you to be involved and contact the members of the Appropriations Committee when this matter comes before them.
When I learned of the proposed closing of Houlton MRS I contacted the House Chair of the Appropriations Committee, Jeremy Fischer and other members of that Committee. They have stated they will stand with me to work to save the Houlton MRS office. They do so, not because of my winning personality, but because now is not the time to close an office that is generating substantial income for the State of Maine.
As a general matter, Maine Revenue Service is, as it name implies, a revenue generating entity. The Houlton office in particular has generated substantial income from inception to present. From October 1999 through January 2007 the Houlton Office has generated revenue of $52.8 million with an annual average of $8 million. Although not tasked with the responsibility of collection, the Houlton office collected $2.7 million in the current fiscal year (from July 1, 2006 to December 31, 2006).
The Houlton Office staff is trained to process income tax, payroll tax, use tax, tax & rent (circuit breaker) and in auditing and collections. Further, the staff is ready, willing and able to engage in these tasks in “quick response” fashion. The Houlton staff is innovative and income generating. For example, this office performs 30 different audit projects in both income tax and use tax divisions. Further, there is an extremely low turnover rate for employees in the Houlton office. Since the office’s inception in 1999 only three employees have left the office. Every time there are openings at the Houlton office they are sought by many highly trained applicants.
With the State of Maine seeking new sources of revenue, now is not the time to eliminate this innovative office or to terminate these outstanding employees. I will continue to urge my fellow legislatures to objectively review the facts and reverse this unfortunate decision. I encourage you to be involved and contact the members of the Appropriations Committee when this matter comes before them.
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